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Abstract
We study the design of randomized controlled experiments when outcomes are signif-
icantly affected by experimental subjects’ unobserved effort expenditure. While stan-
dard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability
of effort compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent
problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs—which we call selective trials—can
help improve external validity. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects
of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can
help identify when treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate
effort expenditure.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the design of experimental trials when outcomes depend significantly on
unobserved effort decisions taken by subjects (agents).1 Even in an ideal setting where the
experimenter (principal) can randomly and independently assign an arbitrarily large number
of agents to the treatment and control groups, unobserved effort limits the informativeness
of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). For example, if a technology’s measured returns are
low, it is difficult to distinguish whether this is because true returns are low or because most
agents believe they are low and therefore expend no effort using the technology. Moreover,
to the extent that effort responds to beliefs, and beliefs respond to information, this makes
it difficult to predict the returns to the technology in the same population as it becomes
better informed. In other words, unobserved effort is a source of heterogeneity in treatment
effects, and is a significant challenge to the external validity of experimental trials.2
We propose simple extensions of RCTs—which we call selective trials—that improve the
external validity of trial results without sacrificing robustness or internal validity. These
experimental designs can be used to determine the extent to which erroneous beliefs or
inappropriate effort affect measured treatment effects. We provide a systematic analysis
of trial design using a principal-agent framework with both adverse selection—an agent’s
type is unobserved—and moral hazard—an agent’s effort is unobserved. However, unlike the
standard principal-agent framework, our principal’s goal is to maximize information about
a technology’s returns—in the sense of Blackwell—rather than profits. The principal seeks
to achieve this objective through single-agent mechanisms that assign agents to treatments
of varying sophistication based on the message they send.
These mechanisms improve on RCTs for two reasons. First, they let agents express
1Throughout the paper we call experimental subjects agents, and call the experimenter the principal.
Following usual conventions, we assume the principal is female, and agents are male.
2Unobserved effort is an issue whether a trial is open—agents know their treatment status—or blind—
agents’ treatment status is obscured by giving the control group a placebo. See Duflo et al. (2008b) for a
more detailed description of RCTs and the external validity issues frequently associated with them.
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preferences over their treatment by probabilistically selecting themselves in or out of the
treatment group at a cost—hence the name selective trials.3 This makes implicit, unob-
served selection an explicit part of the experimental design. Second, these mechanisms allow
for treatments of varying richness: in open trials, treatment corresponds to access to the
new technology; in blind trials, treatment corresponds to an undisclosed allotment of the
technology, and information about the probability of having been allotted the technology;
and in incentivized trials, treatment corresponds to access to the technology as well as an
incentive, or insurance, contract based on outcomes.
Our results fall into two broad categories. Given a type of treatment (open, blind or
incentivized) our first set of results characterize maximally informative mechanisms and
examine the sampling patterns such mechanisms induce. We show that a mechanism is
maximally informative if and only if it identifies an agent’s preferences over all possible
treatment assignments and, given preferences, still assigns each agent to the treatment or
control group with positive probability. Thus, our designs encapsulate the data generated
by a standard randomized controlled trial. These designs can be implemented in a number
of intuitive ways, such as a menu of lotteries, or utilizing the design of Becker et al. (1964),
referred to as the BDM mechanism.
While our main focus is on identification, and thus infinite samples, selective trials may
impose sampling costs on experimenters. In particular, sampling patterns do not matter
when arbitrarily large samples are available, but affect statistical power in finite samples.
In any mechanism that identifies agents’ preferences in a strictly incentive-compatible way,
agents with a higher value for the technology must be assigned to the treatment group with
higher probability, which can reduce statistical power. However, these sampling costs can be
reduced by diminishing incentives for the truthful reporting of preferences. This allows the
experimenter to strike a balance between sampling costs and the precision of the preference
3For simplicity, we focus on monetary costs, but selection could also be based on non-monetary costs. For
example, agents could choose between lines with different wait times to place themselves into the treatment
group with different probabilities.
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data that is obtained. As detailed later, these results contribute to recent discussions about
the usefulness of charging subjects for access to treatment in RCTs (see, for instance, Cohen
and Dupas, 2010; Dupas, 2009; or Ashraf et al., 2010).
Our second class of results characterizes what can be inferred from selective trials, and
highlights how they contribute to the ongoing discussion about the external validity of field
experiments (Deaton, 2010; Imbens, 2010). By eliciting agents’ value for the technology,
open selective trials recover the distribution of returns as a function of willingness to pay.
As a result, open trials provide a simple and robust way to recover the marginal treatment
effects (MTEs) introduced by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). Identifying MTEs is valuable as
they can be used to forecast the effect of policies that change accessibility of the technology,
such as subsidies. However, MTEs are typically not sufficient to make projections about
interventions that alter beliefs and effort expenditure, such as informational campaigns.4
Selective trials go beyond MTEs and identify deep parameters by letting agents express
preferences over richer treatments. Specifically, we consider blind trials where treatment
status is hidden from agents by providing the control group with a placebo. This allows the
principal to vary the information an agent has about his treatment status. This variation
can be used to identify the pure effect of treatment and effort, the effect of their interaction,
and agents’ perceived returns to effort.5 As blind trials are rarely used in economics—often
for want of a convincing, ethical placebo—we extend the analysis to incentivized selective
4In addition, selective trials may alleviate subversions of experimental protocol discussed in Deaton (2010).
That is, explicitly allowing the agents to select themselves in and out of treatment may reduce the number
of agents in the control group who obtain the treatment by other means, as well as the number of agents in
the treatment group that refuse to be treated. Furthermore, the principal may use the information revealed
by agents’ preferences to increase monitoring of agents who expressed a high value for treatment but were
assigned to the control group. Malani (2008) proposes a related solution: a trial design in which agents may
select the nature of their control treatment, thus reducing incentives to subvert the experimental protocol.
5Although uncommon in economics, blind trials are quite common in medicine. For a brief review of
RCTs in medicine see Stolberg et al. (2004). Jadad and Enkin (2007) provides a more comprehensive
review. Selective trials nest a class of trial designs referred to as preference trials, in which at least one
group of agents is allowed to choose their treatment. These designs have primarily been used in medicine
to understand the ethics of randomized controlled trials and facilitate informed consent. Our work shows
that eliciting preferences is not incompatible with randomization, and that preferences carry information
that facilitates inference from treatment effects. For more on preference trials, see Zelen (1979); Flood et al.
(1996); Silverman and Altman (1996); King et al. (2005); Jadad and Enkin (2007); Tilbrook (2008).
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trials in which agents know their treatment status, but receive different transfers conditional
on observable outcomes. Under mild assumptions, this produces information similar to that
produced by selective blind trials.
This paper contributes primarily to the literature on treatment effects. Most of this
literature, based on a statistical framework quite different from our principal-agent approach,
has focused on much simpler effort decisions and the ex post analysis of data. Agents are
usually viewed as either taking treatment or not (with some exceptions: see Jin and Rubin,
2008, for a recent example), and more importantly, this decision is assumed to be observable,
or sufficiently correlated with exogenous observable variables (Imbens and Angrist, 1994;
Angrist et al., 1996; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005). In contrast, we consider effort decisions
which are unobservable and high dimensional. Additionally, most previous approaches, even
those that rely—as we do—on decision theory, focus on modeling data from an RCT after it
has been run (Philipson and Desimone, 1997; Philipson and Hedges, 1998).6 We take an ex
ante perspective and propose designs for experimental trials that can help understand how
beliefs and effort affect treatment effects.
Successful implementation of the trial designs suggested by our principal-agent approach
requires addressing a number of challenges. A practical limitation of our approach is that
large samples may be needed to estimate all identifiable parameters. This limitation is in-
herent in any non-parametric estimation of treatment effects conditional on a large set of
explanatory variables (see, for example, Pagan and Ullah, 1999). Another challenge is how to
extract reliable preference data from agents. Mechanisms that are equivalent in theory, due
to the assumption of rationality, may have very different properties in practice. Thus, exper-
imenters may prefer to elicit coarser preference information in order to use simpler designs.
We believe that these practical concerns are best resolved through a mix of laboratory and
6These studies use information correlated with agents’ decisions to comply or not comply with their
assigned treatments to refine understanding of treatment effects. This approach, as well as ours, is closely
related to the classic Roy (1951) selection model in which selection into treatment reveals information about
an agent’s type (Heckman and Honore´, 1990; Heckman et al., 1997).
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field experiments in well-understood environments. Therefore, it is encouraging that many
elements of selective trials are already being evaluated in field settings (see, for example,
Karlan and Zinman, 2009; Ashraf et al., 2010; Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Berry et al., 2011).
A final set of challenges are more theoretical, and deal with extending our mechanisms to
elicit richer information, such as the variation of preferences over time, or beliefs about other
participants.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses a simple example to illustrate the main
points of the paper. Section 3 defines the general framework. Section 4 investigates open
selective trials. Section 5 turns to blind selective trials, and shows how they can be used to
identify true and perceived returns to effort. Section 6 analyzes incentivized trials, which
eschew placebos, and shows that under reasonable assumptions they can be as informative as
blind selective trials. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the limitations of, and future
directions for, our approach to designing randomized controlled experiments.
2 An Example
To illustrate the basic insights underlying selective trials, and the potential usefulness of
the data they generate, this section adopts a particularly simple model of the relationships
between agents’ beliefs, effort decisions, and outcomes. We emphasize that this structure
makes inference particularly stark. Subsequent sections study inference in a much more
general model that incorporates many important aspects of actual experiments.
To fix ideas, we discuss the example in terms of an experiment evaluating the health
effects of a water treatment product.7
7It should be noted that while our main focus is on the use of RCTs in medical, public health, and
development contexts, our analysis applies to most environments involving decentralized experimentation.
For instance, if a firm wants to try a new way to organize production, specific plant managers will have to
decide how much effort to expend implementing it. The firm’s CEO is in the same position as the principal
in our framework, and must guess the effort expended by his managers when evaluating returns to the new
production scheme. Similarly, if a school board wants to experiment with a new program, individual teachers
and administrators will have to decide how much effort to expend on implementing the program.
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2.1 A Simple Model
There are infinitely many agents indexed by i ∈ N. Each agent has a treatment status
τi ∈ {0, 1}. If τi = 1 agent i is in the treatment group, and is given the water treatment
product. Otherwise, τi = 0, and the agent is in the control group.
Agent i obtains a final outcome yi ∈ {0, 1} that can be measured by the principal. In
our example yi = 1 indicates that the agent has remained healthy. The probability that an
agent remains healthy depends on both treatment and effort
Prob(yi = 1|ei, τi) = q0 +Reiτi,
where ei ∈ [0, 1] is agent i’s decision of whether or not to expend effort using the product,
R ∈ [RL, RH ] is the technology’s return, which is common to all agents, and q0 is the unknown
baseline likelihood of staying healthy over the study period, which will be controlled for using
randomization. Agents have different types t that characterize their beliefs about returns R.
We denote by Rt = EtR the returns expected by an agent of type t. The distribution FRt of
expectations Rt in the population need not be known to the principal or the agents.
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We assume throughout that effort is private and cannot be monitored by the principal.
In other words, we assume that all observable dimensions of effort are already controlled for,
and focus on those dimensions that are not observable. For example, with a water treatment
product, an experimenter may be able to determine whether or not the agent has treated
water in his home, but it may be much more difficult to determine if the agent drinks treated
water when away from home.9
8For illustrative purposes, this example focuses on heterogenous beliefs as a source of heterogenous be-
havior and returns. In this setting, convincingly identifying true returns to treatment has a large effect on
behavior, and would be particularly valuable. Moreover, the example allows effort to affect outcomes only
in the treatment group. The general framework, described in Section 3, allows for: general, idiosyncratic,
returns; effort in both the treatment and control group; and effort along an arbitrary number of dimensions,
which can accommodate dynamic effort expenditure.
9Still, as Duflo et al. (2010) shows, innovative monitoring technologies may be quite effective. To the
extent that monitoring is feasible, it should be done.
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Given effort ei, agent i’s expected utility is given by
Et[yi|ei]− cei,
where c ∈ (RL, RH) is the agents’ cost of effort. In our example, this may be the cost of
remembering to use the product, the social cost of refusing untreated water, or disliking the
taste of treated water. In addition, we assume each agent has quasilinear preferences with
respect to money. An agent’s willingness to pay for treatment is Vt = max{Rt− c, 0}, which
we assume is less than some value Vmax for all agents.
We focus initially on open trials, in which agents know their treatment status, and con-
trast two ways of running trials: a standard RCT, where agents are randomly assigned to the
treatment group with probability pi, and a selective open trial that allows agents to express
preferences for treatment by selecting their probability of treatment.
The implementation of selective trials we explore here uses the BDM mechanism, and
proceeds as follows:
1. Each agent sends a message mi ∈ [0, Vmax] indicating his willingness to pay for treat-
ment;
2. A price pi to obtain treatment is independently drawn for each agent from a distribution
with convex support and c.d.f. Fp that satisfies 0 < Fp(0) < Fp(Vmax) < 1; and
3. If mi ≥ pi, the agent obtains the treatment at price p, otherwise, the agent is in the
control group and no transfers are made.
Note that a higher message m increases an agent’s probability of treatment, Fp(m), as well
as his expected payment:
∫
p≤m p dFp. As Fp has convex support, it is dominant for an agent
of type t to send message m = Vt.
2.2 The Limits of RCTs and the Value of Self-Selection
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Inference from Randomized Controlled Trials. We begin by considering the informa-
tion produced by an RCT. If agent i is in the treatment group, he chooses to expend effort
e = 1 if and only if Rt ≥ c. Hence, the average treatment effect identified by an RCT is
∆RCT = E[y|τ = 1]− E[y|τ = 0]
= E[q0 +R× 1Rt≥c|τ = 1]− E[q0|τ = 0]
= R× Prob (Rt > c) = R× (1− FRt(c)).
When the distribution of agents’ expectations FRt is known, then an RCT will identify R.
However, in most cases FRt is not known, and the average treatment effect ∆
RCT provides a
garbled signal of the underlying returns R. If the outcomes in the treatment group are only
weakly better than those in the control group, the principal does not know if this is because
the water treatment product is not particularly useful, or because the agents did not expend
sufficient effort using it.
Inference from Open Selective Trials. We now turn to selective trials and show they
are more informative than RCTs.
The selective trial described above elicits agents’ willingness to pay and, conditional on
a given willingness to pay V , generates non-empty treatment and control groups. As it is
dominant for agents to truthfully reveal their value, an agent with value Vt has probability
Fp(Vt) of being in the treatment group and probability 1 − Fp(Vt) of being in the control
group. Both of these quantities are strictly positive as 0 < Fp(0) < Fp(Vmax) < 1.
10
This trial provides us with the set of local instruments needed by Heckman and Vytlacil
(2005) to estimate marginal treatment effects (MTEs). That is, for any willingness to pay
10Note also that agents with higher value are treated with higher probability. This matters for the precision
of estimates in actual experiments, where sample size is not infinite. We return to this point in Section 4.
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V , we are able to estimate
∆MTE(V ) ≡ E[y|τ = 1, Vt = V ]− E[y|τ = 0, Vt = V ]
= E[y|τ = 1,mt = V ]− E[y|τ = 0,mt = V ],
which can be used to perform policy simulations in which the distribution of types is constant
but access to the technology is changed, for example, by subsidies. Moreover, MTEs can be
integrated to recover the average treatment effect identified by an RCT.
In the current environment, willingness to pay is a good signal of future use, and thus
MTEs can be used to identify the true returns R. Specifically, all agents with value Vt > 0
have expectations Rt such that Rt − c > 0, and expend effort e = 1 using the technology.11
Hence, it follows that
∆MTE(V > 0) = E [q0 +R× et |τ = 1, Vt > 0]− E[q0|τ = 0, Vt > 0]
= R.
A selective trial identifies the average treatment effect, MTEs, and true returns R. Hence,
it is more informative than an RCT, which only identifies the average treatment effect.
The true returns R, and the distribution of valuations Vt, have several policy uses. First,
knowing R allows us to simulate the treatment effect for a population in which all agents
expend the appropriate amount of effort. Second, these variables allow us to estimate the
returns to increasing usage within a given population. Third, and finally, the data provided
by a selective trial can be used to inform agents and disrupt learning traps more effectively
than data from an RCT. For example, imagine that true returns to the technology are high,
11In this environment, the same result can be obtained by charging a price p for a probability of treatment
pi such that FRt
(
p
pi − c
)
> 0, and evaluating treatment effects only for those willing to pay. The idea that
higher prices will select individuals who value the technology more, and use it more intensely, can be traced
back to the seminal selection model of Roy (1951). See Oster (1995) for a discussion of related ideas in the
context of non-profit organizations.
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but most agents believe they are low. In that case, an RCT will measure low returns to
the treatment and will not convince agents that they should be expending more effort. In
contrast, the data generated by a selective trial would identify that true returns are high,
and lead agents to efficiently adopt the water treatment product.12
2.3 Richer Treatments
In the previous subsection, a selective trial identified true returns because willingness to pay
was a good predictor of usage. However, as our continuing example shows, this will not always
be the case. Thus, MTEs are generally not sufficient to infer true returns, nor whether beliefs
are affecting measured treatment effects. However, more sophisticated selective trials, such
as blind selective trials or incentivized selective trials, can be used to recover true returns.
We modify the example so that the returns R to the technology include both baseline
returns and returns to effort: R = (Rb, Re) ∈ R2. In the context of a water treatment
product, Rb could be the baseline returns to using the product only when it is convenient
to do so, and Re the additional returns to using it more thoroughly (for example, bringing
treated water when away from home). Success rates given effort and treatment status are:
Prob(y = 1|τ = 0, e) = q0
Prob(y = 1|τ = 1, e) = q0 +Rb + eRe.
An agent of type t has expectation (Rb,t, Re,t) about returns R = (Rb, Re), and expends
effort if and only if Re,t ≥ c. Therefore, an agent’s willingness to pay for treatment is given
by Vt = Rb,t + max {Re,t − c, 0}.
12For empirical work in development economics on the effect of information on behavior, see Thornton
(2008), Nguyen (2009) or Dupas (2011). For theoretical work on failures of social learning, see the classic
models of Banerjee (1992) or Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
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Inference from Open Selective Trials. We have already shown that open selective
trials can identify treatment effects conditional on willingness to pay. However, in the current
environment, willingness to pay is no longer a good signal of effort. Indeed, there are now two
reasons why an agent might value treatment: he believes that a thorough use of the product
has high returns (Re,t is high)—the channel emphasized in Section 2.2—or he believes that
a casual use of the water treatment product is sufficient to obtain high returns and that
thorough use brings little additional return (Rb,t is high, but Re,t is low). That is, agents
who are willing to pay because they think baseline returns are high need not be the agents
who will actually expend effort. Formally, a selective trial still identifies MTEs,
∆MTE(V ) = Rb +ReProb(Re,t ≥ c|Rb,t + max{Re,t − c, 0} = V ),
but these are generally not sufficient to recover Rb and Re.
13 As a result, MTEs are insuffi-
cient to simulate the returns in a population of agents that all expended appropriate effort,
or more generally, the returns from increasing the effort of agents. Nor do MTEs provide
the information needed to infer true returns.
Blind Selective Trials. In a blind trial, an agent does not know his treatment status
τ ∈ {0, 1} at the time of effort, but rather, knows his probability φ ∈ [0, 1] of having been
assigned to the treatment group. Open trials are blind trials where φ is either 0 or 1.
Given a probability φ of being treated, an agent expends effort if and only if φRe,t−c > 0.
An agent’s expected value for being treated with probability φ is
Vt(φ) = φRb,t + max{φRe,t − c, 0}.
We depart from standard blind trials in a simple but fundamental way: while they keep φ
13For instance, it is not possible to distinguish a situation in which returns to effort are equal to Re and
a proportion ηV of agents with value V expends effort, from a situation in which returns to effort are 2Re
and a proportion η2V of agents with value V expends effort.
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fixed and do not infer anything from the specific value of φ used, we allow φ to vary and use
both willingness to pay for, and outcomes at, different values of φ for inference.14
As with open trials, willingness to pay can be elicited using a BDM-type mechanism.
Since willingness to pay Vt(φ) now depends on φ, the mechanism in Section 2.1 is implemented
after the agent is asked to send a message m(φ) for each possible value of φ. A value of φi
is then drawn independently for each agent from a c.d.f. Fφ, with full support on [0, 1] and
mass points at 0 and 1. Transfer pi is independently drawn from a c.d.f. Fp, as before. If
m(φi) ≥ pi, the agent pays pi and is allotted the treatment with probability φi ; otherwise,
the agent is in the control group and no transfers are made.
A first advantage of blind trials is that, unlike open trials, an agent’s actual treatment
status τ and his belief φ about his treatment status can be different. This allows for a robust
identification of baseline returns Rb. If an agent is assigned a probability of treatment
0 < φ < 1 low enough that φRH < c, he will not expend any effort. Still, a proportion φ > 0
of such agents receive treatment while a proportion 1−φ > 0 do not. Hence, we can identify
Rb by measuring the effect of treatment for agents known not to expend effort:
Rb = E
[
y
∣∣∣φ < c
RH
, τ = 1
]
− E
[
y
∣∣∣φ < c
RH
, τ = 0
]
.
A second advantage of blind trials is that the agents’ value mapping Vt(φ) allows iden-
tification of which agents would expend effort when treated for sure. The amount that an
agent with belief φ = 1/2 is willing to pay to learn his treatment status is
θt ≡ 1
2
[Vt(φ=1) + Vt(φ=0)]− Vt(φ=1/2).
If the agent does not intend to expend effort when treated for sure, he will not value in-
formation, and θt will be equal to 0. Inversely, if the agent does intend to expend effort,
14A similar insight comes from Malani (2006), which identifies placebo effects by examining variation in
outcomes associated with variations in the probability of treatment across blinded experiments.
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information is valuable since it allows him to tailor his behavior to his treatment status, and
thus θt > 0.
15 In the current example, provided that a positive measure of agents satisfies
θt > 0, we can identify Re using either of the following expressions:
Re = E[y|φ=1, θt>0, τ=1]− E[y|φ=1, θt=0, τ=1]
= E[y|φ=1, θt>0, τ=1]− E
[
y
∣∣∣φ< c
RH
, θt>0, τ=1
]
.
Incentivized Selective Trials. We now show that incentivized selective trials can provide
the principal with information similar to that produced by blind selective trials. This is useful
as in many areas of economic interest, blind trials are not practical due to the lack of suitable,
or ethical, placebos.
In an incentivized selective trial, an agent obtains a treatment status τ ∈ {0, 1}, makes
a fixed transfer p (which can be positive or negative), and is given a bonus (or penalty) w in
the event that y = 1. Note that if p > 0 and w > 0, then an agent is assigned an incentive
contract. If, instead, p < 0 and w < 0, an agent is assigned an insurance contract.
Given a bonus level w, an agent expends effort if and only if (1 +w)Re,t− c > 0. In turn,
an agent’s willingness to pay for treatment, given bonus w, is
Vt(w) = (1 + w)Rb,t + max{(1 + w)Re,t − c, 0}.
As before, the mapping w 7→ Vt(w) can be elicited using a variant of the BDM mechanism
(described in Appendix B). Incentivized trials allow us to evaluate baseline returns in a
straightforward manner. When offered a full insurance contract w0 = −1, an agent will
15This result holds very generally—see Proposition 5. To verify this relationship in the current example,
note that if the agent expends effort conditional on being treated for sure (that is, Re,t > c), then
θt =
1
2
[Rb,t +Re,t − c]− 12Rb,t −max
{
1
2
Re,t − c, 0
}
≥ min
{
Re,t − c
2
,
c
2
}
> 0.
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expend effort e = 0 so that
Rb = E[y|w=w0, τ=1]− E[y|w=w0, τ=0].
In turn, notice that for any type t with Re,t > 0, there exists a value wt such that whenever
w > wt, the agent expends effort e = 1. The value wt is identified from the mapping
w 7→ Vt(w) as
∂Vt
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w>wt
= Re,t +Rb,t > Rb,t =
∂Vt
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w<wt
.
Additionally, this last expression allows us to identify the agent’s subjective beliefs about
baseline returns and returns to effort (Rb,t, Re,t). For a value w sufficiently high that it
induces some agents to expend effort, returns to effort can be identified by either of the
following expressions
Re = E[y|w=w,w − wt>0, τ=1]− E[y|w=w,w − wt<0, τ=1]
= E[y|w=w,w − wt>0, τ=1]− E[y|w=w0, w − wt>0, τ=1].
Thus, just like blind selective trials, incentivized selective trials identify true returns R =
(Rb, Re).
Altogether, this section suggests that while unobserved effort is an issue for the external
validity of standard randomized controlled trials, appropriate ex ante trial design—rather
than ex post data treatment—may help in alleviating these concerns.
The rest of the paper explores how these results extend in a general framework that
allows for many realistic elements. In particular, this general framework allows for arbitrary
heterogeneity among agents, including heterogeneous preferences, beliefs, and returns. More-
over, the general framework allows for multidimensional effort in both the treatment and
control group. This allows the model to accommodate complex technologies, dynamic effort
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expenditure, and attempts by agents in the control group to obtain substitute treatments.
The following sections provide systematic results about which mechanisms are the most
informative, what sampling patterns they produce, and what can be inferred from the data
they generate.
3 A General Framework
We now generalize the framework used in our example. Once again, there are infinitely
many agents, indexed by i ∈ N. However, returns to the technology are now described by a
multidimensional parameter R ∈ R ⊂ Rκ.
Types. Each agent i has a type t ∈ T , which includes a belief about returns R, as well
as other factors that might affect behavior and outcomes, such as idiosyncratic costs of
effort, idiosyncratic returns, and beliefs about such factors. We assume that agents are
exchangeable, so that their types are i.i.d. draws from some distribution χ ∈ ∆(T ), which
is itself a random variable. A profile of types is given by t ∈ T N. For conciseness we omit
publicly observable traits, but it is straightforward to allow for them.
Outcomes and Success Rates. Agent i obtains an outcome yi ∈ {0, 1}.16 An agent’s true
and perceived likelihoods of success (that is, Prob(y = 1)) depend on his type, the aggregate
returns to the technology and the agent’s effort choice e ∈ E, where E is a compact subset
of Rκ′ .
Success rates are denoted by
q(R, t, τi, ei) = Prob(y=1|R, t, τi, ei)
qt(τi, ei) =
∫
R
q(R, t, τi, ei)dt(R)
16As Appendix A shows, binary outcomes simplify notation, but are not essential to our results.
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where q(R, t, τ, e) is the true success rate of an agent of type t, which allows for idiosyncratic,
heterogeneous returns, while qt(τ, e) is the probability of success perceived by an agent of
type t, which allows for idiosyncratic, heterogeneous beliefs about those returns. We assume
that q and qt are continuous with respect to effort e. Note that as e can be multidimensional,
the model is consistent with dynamic effort expenditure, and agents learning about returns
to treatment, or their treatment status (as in Philipson and Desimone, 1997; or Chan and
Hamilton, 2006).17
Preferences. Given effort ei, treatment status τi, monetary transfer pi, and final outcome
yi, agent i’s utility is u(yi, ti)− c(ei, ti)− pi.
Note that pi can be negative and all transfers can be shifted by a fixed amount, for
example, when there is compensation for participating in the experiment. Such compensation
may be used to increase participation, or relax agents’ cash constraints.18
Assignment Mechanisms. We distinguish three ways of assigning treatment:
1. Open selective trials are mechanisms Go = (Mo, µo) where Mo is a set of messages and
µo : Mo → ∆({0, 1} × R) maps individual messages to a probability distribution over
treatment status τi ∈ {0, 1} and transfers pi ∈ R;
2. Blind selective trials are mechanisms Gb = (Mb, µb) where Mb is a set of messages and
µb : Mb → ∆([0, 1] × R) maps messages to a probability distribution over uncertain
treatment status φi = Prob(τi = 1) and transfers pi; and
17 For example, it is not enough for agents to just expend effort spreading fertilizer. As Duflo et al. (2008a)
highlights, effort is needed to choose the appropriate seeds to go with the fertilizer, to learn how much and
when to water the crops, and to learn how much fertilizer gives the highest returns at the lowest cost. In
this case, it is natural to think of effort as a vector, where the first component corresponds to choosing the
amount of fertilizer, the second to picking the right seeds, the third to properly applying it, and so on.
To accommodate dynamic effort expenditure, different dimensions of the effort vector may indicate con-
tingent effort expenditure depending on realized observables, such as the state of crops, or how they seem
to respond to previous fertilizer use.
18Appendix A allows for agents with non-quasilinear preferences and thus tradeoffs between treatment
and non-monetary costs.
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3. Incentivized selective trials are mechanisms Gw = (Mw, µw) where Mw is a set of
messages and µw : Mw → ∆({0, 1}×R×R) maps messages to a probability distribution
over treatment status τi, a fixed transfer pi from the agent to the principal, and a bonus
wi transferred from the principal to the agent conditional on yi = 1.
Note that these are single agent mechanisms. Agent i’s final assignment depends only on
his message, and not on messages sent by others. We denote the likelihood of being given
the treatment when sending message m by pi(m) ≡ Prob(τ = 1|m). We focus largely on
mechanisms G such that χ-almost surely every agent i has a dominant message mG(ti). In
all these designs, agents can probabilistically select their assignment using messages, hence
the name selective trials.
Informativeness of Mechanisms. We evaluate mechanisms according to their informa-
tiveness in the sense of Blackwell. We say a mechanism G is at least as informative as a
mechanism G′, denoted by G′  G, if the data generated by G′ can be simulated using only
data generated by G.
Specifically, denote by ai the assignment given to agent i by whichever mechanism is
chosen. The principal observes data dG = (mi, ai, yi)i∈N. Denote by DG the set of possible
data sequences generated by mechanism G. Mechanism G′  G if and only if there exists
a fixed data manipulation procedure h : DG → ∆(DG′) such that for all t ∈ T N, R ∈ R,
h(dG(t, R)) ∼ dG′(t, R).
This notion of informativeness is easier to work with in environments with infinite sam-
ples, as this focuses on issues of identification rather than issues of statistical power. However,
this definition also applies in the case of finitely many agents.19
Although our framework is quite general, we intentionally limit our approach in three
ways. First, we assume agents are rational, that is, they play undominated strategies,
19With infinite samples, sampling patterns do not matter. Thus, there is a large equivalence class of most
informative mechanisms. When samples are finite, these mechanisms remain undominated in the sense of
Blackwell, but need no longer be equivalent.
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regardless of the complexity of the assignment mechanism. Second, we examine only single-
agent mechanisms. Third, despite the fact that effort expenditure may be dynamic, we
restrict attention to mechanisms that elicit preferences only once. Note, however, that the
timing of this elicitation may be freely chosen by the principal. Specifically, messages could
be elicited before agents have any exposure to the technology, or after they have assessed it.
Section 7 discusses the limitations of assuming rationality and examining only single-agent
mechanisms, and the difficulties of eliciting preferences more than once.
4 Open Selective Trials
In open selective trials an agent is assigned a treatment status τ and a transfer p based
on message m. Given this assignment (τ, p), the indirect utility of an agent with type t is
Vt(τ)− p where,
Vt(τ) = max
e∈E
qt(τ, e)u(y=1, t) + [1− qt(τ, e)]u(y=0, t)− c(e, t).
We normalize the value of being in the control group Vt(τ=0) to zero for every type. Hence
Vt ≡ Vt(τ=1) denotes the agent’s willingness to pay for treatment. For simplicity, we assume
that there exists a known value Vmax ∈ R > 0 such that for all t ∈ T , Vt ∈ (−Vmax, Vmax),
and that the distribution over values induced by the distribution of types χ admits a density.
The optimal effort for type t given treatment status τ is denoted by e∗(τ, t).20
4.1 Information Production in Open Selective Trials
Our first result highlights the fact that selective trials are natural extensions of RCTs. An
RCT is a mechanism G0 = (∅, pi0). As M = ∅, no messages are sent, all agents are assigned
to the treatment group with the same probability pi0 ∈ (0, 1), and there are no transfers.
20At this stage, whether optimal effort is unique or not does not matter. We explicitly assume a unique
optimal effort level in Sections 5 and 6 to apply a convenient version of the Envelope Theorem.
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Fact 1 (full support sampling). Consider a mechanism G = (M,µ). If there exists ξ > 0
such that for all m ∈M , pi(m) ∈ (ξ, 1− ξ), then, with infinite samples, G0  G.
Proof: All proofs can be found in the online appendix. 
Recalling that pi(m) ≡ Prob(τ = 1|m), Fact 1 shows that if every type has a positive
probability of being in the treatment or control group, then mechanism G is as informative
as an RCT. This holds for any ξ > 0 because the sample size is infinite. The assumption
of infinite samples—which is maintained throughout the paper—is important for all of our
identification results. We discuss sampling issues that arise with finite samples in Section
4.2.
As Plott and Zeiler (2005) and others show, information elicited in non-incentive-compatible
ways can be unreliable. Moreover, as Kremer and Miguel (2007) and others note, reported
beliefs about a technology’s return are often uncorrelated with use. Therefore, we focus
on strictly incentive-compatible assignment mechanisms—assignment mechanisms such that
χ-almost every agent has a strictly preferred message.21
Our next result shows that an open selective trial is a most informative trial if and only
if it identifies each agent’s value Vt, and, conditional on any expressed valuation, assigns a
positive mass of agents to both the treatment and control group.
Proposition 1 (most informative mechanisms). Any strictly incentive-compatible mecha-
nism G identifies at most value Vt (that is, Vt = Vt′ ⇒ mG(t) = mG(t′)).
Whenever G identifies values Vt (that is, mG(t) = mG(t
′) ⇒ Vt = Vt′) and satisfies
full support (0 < infm pi(m) and supm pi(m) < 1), then for any strictly incentive-compatible
mechanism G′, G′  G.
21Note that the mechanisms we consider can accommodate surveys. Consider the mechanism G = (T , pi0)
where the message space M = T , the likelihood of treatment is constant and equal to pi0, and no transfers
are made. This is essentially an RCT supplemented with a rich survey. As assignment does not depend on
the message, truthful revelation of one’s type is weakly dominant. Unfortunately, any other message is also
weakly dominant. Hence, data generated by such a mechanism is likely to be unreliable, especially if figuring
out one’s preferences is costly.
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It follows that open selective trials can identify at most the distribution of returns con-
ditional on agents’ valuations, which can be used to construct marginal treatment effects
(MTEs). It is important to note that these mechanisms identify MTEs independently of
the experimenter’s beliefs. Hence, to the extent that elicited values are reliable, these mech-
anisms identify MTEs with a degree of robustness comparable to that with which RCTs
identify average treatment effects.22
Implementing Most Informative Trials. Here we exhibit two straightforward imple-
mentations of most informative selective trials. The first is the BDM mechanism described in
Section 2.1, with the expanded message space M = [−Vmax, Vmax]. Once again, the principal
draws a price pi ∈ [−Vmax, Vmax] independently for each agent from a common c.d.f. Fp with
support [−Vmax, Vmax]. If mi ≥ pi, then the agent is assigned (τ = 1, pi); otherwise, he is
assigned (τ=0, 0).
Fact 2 (BDM Implementation). Whenever Fp has full support over [−Vmax, Vmax], an agent
with value Vt sends optimal message mBDM = Vt and the BDM mechanism is a most infor-
mative mechanism.
A second implementation is a menu of lotteries. Consider mechanism G∗, where M =(−1
2
, 1
2
)
, any agent sending message m is assigned to the treatment group with probability
pi(m) = 1
2
+ m, and must make a transfer p(m) = Vmaxm
2. One can think of agents as
having a baseline probability of being in the treatment group equal to 1
2
and deciding by
how much they want to deviate from this baseline. An agent with value Vt chooses message
m to maximize
pi(m)Vt − p(m) = Vt
(
1
2
+m
)
− Vmaxm2.
This problem is concave in m, and first order conditions yield an optimal message Vt/2Vmax,
which identifies Vt. In addition, every agent is assigned to the treatment and control group
22Note that selective trials also identify higher order moments of the outcome distribution conditional on
treatment status and willingness to pay, which may be useful to researchers.
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with positive probability. Thus G∗ is a most informative mechanism.
Note that G∗ gives agents higher expected utility than an RCT that assigns agents to the
treatment and control group with probability 1
2
. More generally, for any RCT, a selective
trial that assigns price p = 0 for a probability of treatment pi equal to that of the RCT must
increase the agents’ expected utility. Thus, selective trials may help decrease the number of
agents who refuse randomization. This is potentially useful as refusals reduce the external
validity of treatment effects (Malani, 2008).23
4.2 The Cost of Running Selective Trials
In equilibrium, the menu of lotteries G∗ yields sampling profile pi(V ) = 1
2
(
1 + V
Vmax
)
, which
is strictly increasing in value V . In the BDM mechanism, the sampling profile piBDM(V ) =
Fp(V ) is also increasing in V . This property holds for any mechanism.
Proposition 2 (monotonicity). Consider a strictly incentive compatible mechanism G. If
agents t and t′ with values Vt > Vt′ send messages mG(t) 6= mG(t′), then it must be that
pi(mG(t)) > pi(mG(t
′)).
Thus, in any selective trial, agents with high values are over-sampled—they have a higher
likelihood of being in the treatment group—and those with low values are under-sampled.
In contrast, RCTs have a flat sampling profile. While sampling patterns do not matter when
there is an arbitrarily large number of agents, they can significantly affect statistical power
when samples are finite.
This issue is related to the recent debate in development economics about charging for
treatment in RCTs.24 If, as in Ashraf et al. (2010), willingness to pay is correlated with
product usage, then eliciting willingness to pay might be quite useful in understanding true
23Jadad and Enkin (2007) reports refusal rates approaching 50 percent in some medical trials.
24This literature is motivated by questions of efficiency, and is mostly interested in whether charging for
usage improves how well treatment is matched with those who need and use it. This paper takes a slightly
different perspective, and is interested in how controlling for willingness to pay improves inference from
experimental trials.
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returns. If, instead, as in Cohen and Dupas (2010), most agents have low values, and
willingness to pay is a poor predictor of actual use, then undersampling agents with low
values may significantly reduce statistical power. Furthermore, in such a setting, willingness
to pay provides little information about intended use.25
We make two contributions to this debate. First, we note that when trade-offs between
money and treatment are uninformative, selective trials can and should be based on more
informative trade-offs. For instance, if most of the heterogeneity in willingness to pay is
driven by wealth and credit constraints, then eliciting willingness to wait, or willingness to
perform a tedious task—like sitting through multiple information sessions—may be a better
indicator of future usage than willingness to pay. As we discuss in Section 7, this requires
some knowledge of the agents and their environment.
Second, we show that carefully designed selective trials can reduce the costs of oversam-
pling by reducing the slope of the sampling profile.
Proposition 3 (sampling rates and incentives). For any mechanism G = (M,µ) and ρ < ρ
in (0, 1), there exists a mechanism G′ = (M,µ′) such that G  G′, and for all m ∈ M ,
pi′(m) ∈ [ρ, ρ].
The following must also hold. Denoting the expected utility of type t sending message m
in mechanism G′ (including transfers) by U(t|m,G′), then
max
m1,m2∈M
|U(t|m1, G′)− U(t|m2, G′)| ≤ 2(ρ− ρ)Vmax.
Proposition 3 implies that it is always possible to reduce the slope of a mechanism’s
sampling profile without affecting identification. Unfortunately, reducing the slope of the
sampling profile also reduces incentives for truth-telling. We illustrate this with the family
of mechanisms (G∗λ)λ∈(0,1) which generalize G
∗ as follows: M =
(−1
2
, 1
2
)
, pi(m) = 1
2
+ λm
and p(m) = λVmaxm
2. As the slope of the sampling profile λ goes to zero, each agent
25As Dupas (2010) shows, this can also hinder social learning.
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will be sampled with probability approaching 1
2
and will pay an amount approaching zero,
irrespective of the message he sends. For any λ > 0, m = Vt/2Vmax is still a dominant
strategy for an agent of type t. However, if an agent with value Vt instead sends message
V/2Vmax with V 6= Vt, his expected loss is
U(t|m = Vt/2Vmax)− U(t|m = V/2Vmax) = λ
4Vmax
(Vt − V )2,
which vanishes as the slope of the sampling profile λ goes to 0.
Importantly, although there is a trade-off between oversampling high values and the
noisiness of the preference information that may be elicited, the slope of the sampling profile
is a free parameter over which the principal can, and should, optimize.
Altogether, this section has shown that open selective trials provide a simple way to
identify MTEs and, more generally, the distribution of returns conditional on willingness to
pay. In addition, while selective trials systematically oversample high value agents, this issue
is negligible when sample size is large or agents are very responsive to incentives. However,
as Section 2 highlights, willingness to pay need not be a good predictor of actual effort, and
MTEs may not allow identification of deep parameters of interest. The following sections
explore richer treatments that can better identify the role of effort.
5 Blind Selective Trials
5.1 Framework and Basic Results
In blind trials, an agent is assigned a probability of being in the treatment group, φ ∈ [0, 1],
which is disclosed to the agent, and an actual treatment status, τ ∈ {0, 1}, which is known
only to the principal. Thus, the pair (τ, φ) can be thought of as a full description of an agent’s
overall treatment. Blind selective trials nest both open selective trials, where φ ∈ {0, 1}, and
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standard blind trials, where φ is fixed.
Assignment Mechanisms. As noted in Section 3, selective blind trials are mechanisms
G = (M,µ) where µ : M → ∆([0, 1] × R). Given a message m, µ assigns the agent a
likelihood of being treated φ ∈ [0, 1], and a transfer p ∈ R. An actual, and unrevealed,
treatment status τ ∈ {0, 1} is drawn according to φ.
Utility and Effort. An agent of type t’s value for uncertain treatment status φ is:
Vt(φ) = max
e∈E
(
φqt(τ=1, e)+(1−φ)qt(τ=0, e)
)(
u(y=1, t)−u(y=0, t)
)
+u(y=0, t)−c(e, t).
(1)
The corresponding effort decision is e∗(φ, t), which we assume is unique.26 Consistent
with earlier notation, we maintain Vt(φ= 0) = 0. Note that Vt(φ= 1) = Vt is the agent’s
value for treatment in an open trial. Throughout the section, we keep φ as an argument
of Vt(φ) and denote the value of Vt(φ) at ϕ by Vt(φ = ϕ). Thus, Vt(φ) denotes the entire
mapping: ϕ 7→ Vt(φ = ϕ). Denoting by µ(φ|m) the distribution of assignments φ given
message m, we have:
Proposition 4 (most informative mechanisms). Any strictly incentive-compatible blind mech-
anism G identifies at most the mapping Vt(φ) (that is, Vt(φ) = Vt′(φ)⇒ mG(t) = mG(t′)).
If G identifies Vt(φ) (that is, mG(t) = mG(t
′)⇒ Vt(φ) = Vt′(φ)) and satisfies infφ,m µ(φ|m) >
0 then G′  G for any strictly incentive-compatible mechanism G′.
A simple generalization of the BDM mechanism is a most informative blind trial. The
blind BDM Mechanism (bBDM) is composed of distributions Fφ over [0, 1], and Fp|φ over
[−Vmax, Vmax] with densities bounded away from 0, and the message spaceM = [−Vmax, Vmax][0,1],
so that a message m corresponds to a value function Vt(φ). An agent sends message mi, and
26Using the results of Milgrom and Segal (2002) this allows us to apply the usual Envelope Theorem to
Vt(φ) in Proposition 6. Note that this also implies that e∗(φ, t) is continuous in φ.
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the principal draws values φi = ϕ and pi according to distributions Fφ and Fp|ϕ. Ifmi(ϕ) ≥ pi,
the agent is assigned (ϕ, pi). Otherwise, the agent is assigned (0, 0). It is straightforward
to show that mbBDM(t) = Vt(φ). Additionally, bBDM satisfies the full sampling constraint
infφ,m µ(φ|m) > 0.
Blind selective trials have two distinct advantages over open selective trials. First, blind
selective trials distinguish an agent’s belief φ and treatment status τ . As detailed in the
next subsection, this allows the principal to identify whether empirical success rates are
being driven by the agent’s behavior or by the treatment itself. Second, by identifying
the value function Vt(φ), blind selective trials provide useful information about an agent’s
intended behavior and his perceived success rate under different conditions.
5.2 The Value of Distinguishing Beliefs and Treatment Status
Changes in success rates due to treatment come from two sources: the effect of the treatment
itself, and the effect of behavioral changes induced by treatment. In an open trial, changes in
behavior are perfectly correlated with changes in treatment status. As a result, the effect of
treatment, and the effect of behavioral changes are difficult to distinguish. In contrast, blind
trials allow us to disentangle these two effects by distinguishing an agent’s actual treatment
status τ and his (correct) belief φ that he is being treated.
We can disentangle these effects by considering E[y|Vt(φ), φ=ϕ, τ ], the measured success
rate conditional on the value function Vt(φ), belief φ = ϕ, and treatment status τ , which
is identified by selective blind trials. This allows identification of MTEs conditioned on the
entire value function, ∆MTE(Vt(φ)), as well as the pure treatment and behavioral effects
∆T (Vt(φ)) and ∆
B(Vt(φ)):
∆T (Vt(φ)) = lim
ϕ→0
ϕ>0
E[y|Vt(φ), φ=ϕ, τ=1]− E[y|Vt(φ), φ=ϕ, τ=0]
∆B(Vt(φ)) = lim
ϕ→1
ϕ<1
E[y|Vt(φ), φ=ϕ, τ=0]− E[y|Vt(φ), φ=0, τ=0].
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As ϕ approaches zero, an agent’s effort converges to e∗(τ = 0, t), the effort he would
expend if he knew he was not treated.27 Hence, ∆T identifies the returns to treatment
keeping the agent’s behavior at its default level e∗(τ =0, t). Similarly, as ϕ approaches one,
the agent’s effort converges to e∗(τ = 1, t), the effort associated with sure treatment. Thus,
∆B is the effect of behavior change alone. Finally,
∆I ≡ ∆MTE −∆T −∆B
measures the aggregate treatment effect (conditional on value Vt(φ)), net of the effect of
treatment and behavior alone. That is, ∆I measures the interaction effect between behavior
and treatment. If ∆I is positive, then treatment and effort changes are complementary in
producing successful outcomes. If, instead, ∆I is negative, this suggests that there is a
negative interaction between treatment and the perceived optimal effort of agents.28
Being able to identify ∆T and ∆B has important practical implications. Consider, for
example, a cholesterol-reducing drug. If agents react to anticipated treatment by eating more
fatty foods, then the aggregate effect of treatment could be quite small even if the effect of
the drug alone is significant. In this environment, ∆T is the treatment effect purified of
changes in behavior, that is, the effect of the drug on people who do not change their diet.
Moreover, the sum of the interaction effect and the pure effect of treatment, ∆I + ∆T , is the
part of treatment effect that could not be obtained without treatment.
When interpreting ∆B and ∆I it is important to keep in mind that these are the direct
and interaction effects at the agents’ perceived optimal effort level e∗(τ=1, t). Consequently,
27We use a continuity argument because φ = 0 implies τ = 0, hence, there is no treatment group. This
is essentially an identification at infinity argument, as in Heckman (1990) or Heckman and Honore´ (1990),
which entails well-known practical difficulties.
28These quantities can also be measured unconditionally across the entire agent population, or conditioned
only on the value for sure treatment, Vt. Moreover, ∆T can be estimated using a standard blind RCT with
a sufficiently low value of φ.
Note that selective blind trials can allow for double-blind designs in which the principal has varying beliefs
about the likelihood that an agent is being treated. Varying the beliefs of the principal may help identify the
treatment effect due to variations in the principal’s behavior. A proper analysis of this approach requires a
better understanding of the principal’s incentive problem, which we abstract away from in this paper.
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if ∆I and ∆B are small, this may be because effort does not improve the success rate of treat-
ment, or because the agent is expending inappropriate effort. In order to distinguish these
two possibilities, we need additional information on the effort of agents. As the following
subsection shows, this is what Vt(φ) provides.
5.3 The Value of Eliciting Preferences Vt(φ)
As highlighted in Section 2.3, the mapping Vt(φ) can tell us whether, and by how much,
treatment changes an agent’s effort. Recalling that Vt(φ=0) = 0, knowledge of the mapping
Vt(φ) provides the following simple test.
Proposition 5 (a test of “intention to change behavior”).
If e∗(φ=0, t) = e∗(φ=1, t), then for all ϕ, Vt(φ=ϕ) = ϕVt(φ=1).
If e∗(φ=0, t) 6= e∗(φ=1, t), then for all ϕ ∈ (0, 1), Vt(φ=ϕ) < ϕVt(φ=1).
When effort changes with τ , the agent gets additional surplus from tailoring his behavior
to his treatment status. The difference ϕVt(φ = 1) − Vt(ϕ) is thus the agent’s willingness
to pay to learn his actual treatment status, which will be zero if effort is independent of
treatment.29 Recalling that qt(τ, e) is the perceived success rate of an agent with type t, the
value function Vt(φ) also allows us to estimate an agent’s perceived returns to effort.
Proposition 6 (identifying perceived returns to effort). For any value ϕ,
∂Vt(φ)
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ
= [qt(τ=1, e
∗(ϕ, t))− qt(τ=0, e∗(ϕ, t))]× [u(y=1, t)− u(y=0, t)].
29When ϕ = 1/2 this coincides with test statistic θt defined in Section 2.3.
Note that in a richer decision theoretic framework, agents may have preferences for early revelation of
uncertainty, even though their actions do not depend on information (Kreps and Porteus, 1978). In such
a framework, an agent’s value for information would be a noisy (but still informative) signal of intent to
change behavior.
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In particular, we can compute the agent’s perceived increase in treatment effects when mov-
ing from default effort (induced by ϕ = 0) to perceived optimal effort given treatment
(induced by ϕ = 1):
∂Vt(φ)
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
1
/
∂Vt(φ)
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
0
=
qt(τ=1, e
∗(ϕ=1, t))− qt(τ=0, e∗(ϕ=1, t))
qt(τ=1, e∗(ϕ=0, t))− qt(τ=0, e∗(ϕ=0, t)) .
This data helps evaluate whether under-provision of effort is to blame for low returns to
treatment.30 Returning to the example in Section 2, imagine a trial of a water treatment
product known to the principal to be effective only if agents use it whenever they drink water.
If measured returns to the treatment are low, there are two competing explanations: 1) the
treatment is not effective in the agents’ disease environment, or 2) agents are not expending
appropriate effort using the product. Agents’ perceived returns can help distinguish these
explanations. If perceived returns to effort are high, then the agent is likely to be expending
significant effort, and it is more likely that the treatment is not effective in a particular
disease environment. If, instead, perceived returns are low, it becomes more likely that the
treatment has an effect that is unmeasured due to agents’ lack of effort.
Preference data Vt(φ) may also provide some insight into the nature of placebo ef-
fects. Under a sufficiently broad definition of behavior—including unconscious or involuntary
behavior—behavioral treatment effects ∆B are largely undistinguishable from placebo effects
(Malani, 2006). However, because indirect preferences identify whether or not agents intend
to change their behavior (Proposition 5), this data provides some indication of whether
behavioral effects ∆B are driven by changes in behavior of which the agent is aware. For
instance, if agents do not value information (Vt(φ = ϕ) = ϕVt(φ = 1)), and yet exhibit
30Identifying these derivatives requires the precise elicitation of an agent’s preferences. This relies heavily
on the rationality of agents, but not sample size.
Note that the logic underlying Proposition 5 implies Vt(φ) must be convex. This follows from the fact
that any mean preserving spread in belief φ is equivalent to the arrival of a signal about treatment status.
As more information is necessarily useful in this setting, this implies that Vt(φ) is convex. Thus, in practice,
it may be preferable to use simpler mechanisms that elicit Vt(φ) for very few values of φ, and construct
discrete approximations of the desired derivatives. As Vt(φ) is convex in φ, a few points are sufficient to
obtain correct bounds on these derivatives.
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positive behavioral effects (∆B > 0), this suggests that changes in behavior the agent is
unaware of are driving behavioral effects.
6 Incentivized Selective Trials
We now show how quantities similar to those identified by blind selective trials can be
identified without a placebo. This can be accomplished using an incentivized selective trial,
which allows agents to express preferences over contracts.31
6.1 Framework and Basic Results
Assignment Mechanisms. As noted in Section 3, an incentivized trial is a mechanism
G = (M,µ), where µ : M → ∆({0, 1} × R × R). Given a message m, µ is used to draw a
treatment status τ , a fixed transfer p from the agent, as well as a bonus w transferred to
the agent in the event of success. Note that both p and w may be negative in the case of
insurance. The pair (τ, w) can be thought of as an aggregate treatment.
Utility and Effort. The agents’ indirect preferences over contracts (τ, w), denoted by
Vt(τ, w), are given by
Vt(τ, w) = max
e∈E
qt(τ, e)[u(y=1, t) + w] + [1− qt(τ, e)]u(y=0, t)− c(e, t). (2)
We denote by e∗(τ, w, t) the induced effort level, and maintain the normalization Vt(τ =
0, w=0) = 0.
Insurance. A specific value of w that will be useful is w0,t ≡ −[u(y= 1, t) − u(y= 0, t)],
the utility difference between success (y = 1) and failure (y = 0) for an agent of type t.
31For field experiments using explicit incentives, see, for instance, Gertler (2004); Schultz (2004); Volpp
et al. (2006, 2008); Thornton (2008); and Kremer et al. (2009). A fully worked-out numerical example
illustrating inference from incentivized trials is given in the online appendix.
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The transfer w0,t essentially provides an agent with perfect insurance over the outcome y.
When fully insured, an agent will choose e to minimize the cost of his effort, regardless of his
treatment status. We refer to this effort choice as no effort. Note that no effort differs from
the default behavior of untreated agents in an open trial, as they may still be expending
effort to improve their success rate.
We proceed by assuming that w0,t is known to the principal. At the end of the section
we show that under mild assumptions, w0,t can be inferred from elicited preferences Vt(τ, w).
6.2 What can be Inferred from Incentivized Trials?
It is straightforward to extend Propositions 1 and 4, which characterize most informative
mechanisms. That is, G is a most informative incentivized trial if it identifies the mapping
Vt(τ, w) and, given any message, puts positive density on all possible treatments (τ, w). As
before, the BDM mechanism can be adapted to identify Vt(τ, w)—Appendix B provides a
detailed description. Note that the information produced by incentivized trials nests that
produced by open trials. In particular, Vt(τ=1, w = 0) = Vt.
As in the case of blind selective trials, incentivized selective trials allow us to disentangle
the effects of treatment and effort, as well as infer an agent’s perception of how effort affects
outcomes. Incentivized selective trials recover the empirical success rate E[y|Vt(τ, w), τ, w]
as a function of preferences, treatment, and incentives. This will be independent of reward
w if effort does not matter for outcomes, or if incentives do not affect effort expenditure.
Isolating Returns to Treatment and Returns to Effort. A contract with transfer
w0,t ≡ −[u(y= 1, t) − u(y= 0, t)] provides an agent of type t with perfect insurance. Thus,
the agent expends no effort, regardless of his treatment status. Given w0,t, we can identify
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two quantities similar to those discussed in Section 5.2:
Returns to Treatment | No Effort = E[y|Vt(τ, w), τ=1, w=w0,t]− E[y|Vt(τ, w), τ=0, w=w0,t]
Returns to Effort | Treatment = E[y|Vt(τ, w), τ=1, w=0]− E[y|Vt(τ, w), τ=1, w=w0,t]
Note that here returns are measured using no effort as a baseline, rather than the default
effort level e∗(τ=0, w=0, t) expended by agents in the control group of an open trial.32
Identifying Perceived Returns to Effort. Indirect preferences over contracts Vt(τ, w)
also provide information on perceived returns to effort. Recall that qt(τ, e) denotes the
agent’s perceived likelihood of success given treatment status τ and effort e.
Proposition 7 (identifying perceived success rates).
∀τ, w, ∂Vt(τ, w)
∂w
= qt(τ, e
∗(τ, w, t)).
Given knowledge of w0,t, this allows us to compute subjective returns to treatment and
perceived optimal effort:
Perceived Returns to Treatment = qt(τ=1, w=w0,t|Vt(τ, w))− qt(τ=0, w=w0,t|Vt(τ, w))
Perceived Returns to Effort = qt(τ=1, w=0|Vt(τ, w))− qt(τ=1, w=w0,t|Vt(τ, w)).
Note that if perceived returns to effort are low, this can indicate that an agent plans to
expend little or no effort using the technology. The principal can use this information in
deciding which agents’ usage to monitor more closely.
The monetary equivalent of the cost of an agent’s optimal effort can be obtained by
32Note that, unlike blind selective trials, identification here does not rely on identification at infinity (see
Footnote 27).
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rearranging (2):
c(e∗(τ, w=0, t))−c(e∗(τ, w=w0,t, t)) = −w0,t×qt(τ, e∗(τ, w=0, t))−[Vt(τ, w=0)−Vt(τ, w=w0,t)].
Note that all parameters on the right-hand side are identified from data, except perhaps w0,t.
Identifying the costs incurred by agents can improve inference by allowing the principal
to distinguish—among agents who believe that appropriate effort has high returns—those
who believe that only a small amount of effort is sufficient to obtain high returns from those
who believe that a significant amount of effort is necessary to obtain high returns.
Identifying the Full Insurance Contract. One drawback of incentivized trials is that
they rely on identifying the full insurance contract w0,t, which may depend on the agent’s
type. However, w0,t can be identified from preference information under mild assumptions.
Fact 3. Assume that outcome y = 1 yields strictly greater utility than y = 0, that is,
u(y=1, t) > u(y=0, t), and an agent perceives treatment to be beneficial:
∀e0 ∈ E,∃e1 ∈ E s.t. c(e1, t) ≤ c(e0, t) and qt(τ=0, e0) < qt(τ=1, e1).
Then, w0,t = max{w | Vt(τ=1, w) = Vt(τ=0, w)}.
In words, when treatment facilitates success, the full insurance transfer w0,t is the highest
transfer such that an agent places no value on obtaining treatment. Note that our assump-
tions rule out cases where an agent believes treatment reduces the likelihood of success, as
well as environments where an agent values treatment only for reasons other than its impact
on the principal’s outcome of interest. Whenever the assumptions of Fact 3 do not hold,
w0,t must be calibrated from alternative data, for example, the expected amount of wages
lost when sick. This is a delicate task, and estimates of w0,t are likely to be noisy. The
corresponding insurance contract would not induce no effort, but rather a small, and slightly
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uncertain, level of effort. Hence, whenever the full insurance contract w0,t is estimated with
noise, this leads to noisy estimates of treatment effects.
7 Discussion
This paper studies inference and external validity when experimental subjects take unob-
served decisions that can affect outcomes. As effort expenditure is driven by beliefs, and
beliefs can respond to information, the returns measured by an RCT may not be represen-
tative of the returns a better informed population would obtain. We take a principal-agent
approach to trial design, where the principal maximizes the informativeness of data. This
leads us to study selective trials, which improve on RCTs by allowing agents to express
preferences over treatments of varying richness. We show that selective trials can identify
whether agents’ beliefs are reducing measured treatment effects, as well as separate the
returns from treatment, effort, and their interaction.
More generally, this paper advocates a mechanism design approach to randomized con-
trolled experiments, an approach we believe can help build bridges between reduced form
methods—largely concerned with robustness and internal validity—and structural methods—
which use models to identify deep parameters needed for external validity. While we believe
this research agenda can yield many useful applications, successfully implementing its in-
sights requires overcoming a number of practical difficulties. In the remainder of this section
we discuss some of these implementation challenges and directions for future work.
7.1 Implementation Issues
In theory, the selective trials described in this paper are robust and require no specific
knowledge on the part of the principal. However, our results are obtained under three
important sets of assumptions that may not hold in practice.
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Behavioral Assumptions. The correct elicitation of preferences, which is key to our
analysis, relies strongly on the assumption that agents are rational. However, as people
often fail to play dominant strategies, BDM-like mechanisms only provide a noisy signal of
the agents’ underlying valuations (Keller et al., 1993; Bohm et al., 1997). This suggests that
running even relatively simple open selective trials, let alone full-fledged blind or incentivized
selective trials, is likely to be challenging.
Agents may also be subject to other behavioral biases that are not taken into account by
our framework.33 A specific concern is that the act of making choices may change agents’
preferences. For example, it is possible that an agent who expresses a strong desire for, but
does not get, treatment, may attempt to obtain treatment by other means, but would not do
so if his valuation was never elicited.34 Another concern is that agents may try to infer the
value of treatment from the principal’s choice of experimental design. For example, similar
to Milgrom and Roberts (1986), if treatment is only available at a high cost, agents may
infer that the technology is more valuable. In these environments, a principal should take
into account how experimental design influences behavior before drawing inferences.35
Ultimately, we believe the best way to address these concerns is through careful and
extensive experimentation, blending both laboratory and field work. As laboratory exper-
iments allow the observation of underlying fundamentals, they are essential to understand
which implementations of selective trials produce more reliable data, and what the relevant
biases may be. In turn, field experiments—in simple environments where actual behavior
is observable, and trustworthy surveys may be conducted—are needed to check that the
insights gathered from the laboratory apply in more realistic settings. We anticipate that
33For instance, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, or even social preferences may play a significant role. A
different bias might come from the psychological cost of parting from any amount money (Cohen and Dupas,
2010; Ashraf et al., 2010).
34A simple way to test for this is to construct a second control group that is never asked to express
preferences.
35For example, the design itself could be considered as part of the experimental treatment. This implies
the principal should compare agents whose preferences are the same, but have been elicited using different
mechanisms.
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appropriate implementations should give agents multiple opportunities to learn how the
relevant mechanism works before they actually express preferences over treatment (Plott
and Zeiler, 2005). Additionally, it may be preferable to use mechanisms that elicit coarse
information about preferences, but impose a smaller cognitive burden on agents.36
Finally, even if our behavioral assumptions are wrong, the data generated still enriches
that obtained through an RCT. Although this invalidates the interpretation of the data
put forth in this paper, it does not preclude a more standard analysis focusing on average
treatment effects, or a more sophisticated analysis taking into account relevant biases.
Sample Size. Large samples are likely to be necessary in order to realize the full value of
the additional data our mechanisms elicit. Note that the difficulty is not with the data collec-
tion process, as the correct elicitation of preferences relies only on rationality. Rather, sample
size restricts the ability to compute meaningful estimates of treatment effects conditional on
preferences. This issue is inherent to any non-parametric estimation of treatment effects
conditional on a rich set of explanatory variables, and existing methodologies apply (see, for
instance, Pagan and Ullah (1999)). Given sufficiently large samples, a kernel regression may
be practical. In small samples, it may be necessary to bin agents with similar preferences.
Alternatively, it may be informative to estimate parametric relationships between treatment
effects and preference data.37
Cash Constraints. Eliciting preferences using monetary trade-offs is impractical in the
presence of severe cash constraints. When only agents are cash constrained, a possible, but
expensive, solution is to give agents a show-up fee that they can use to express preferences.
More fundamentally, monetary trade-offs may be uninformative of intended behavior in
36In the case of open selective trials, one may elicit the agent’s preferences over only a few lotteries—see
Appendix B for a discussion. In the case of blind selective trials, one may elicit Vt(φ) at a few values of φ
and exploit the fact that Vt(φ) is convex to fit simple functional forms.
37Note that controlling for preferences may reduce the heterogeneity of treatment effects within each bin.
This may alleviate statistical power concerns.
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environments where there is sizable heterogeneity in the marginal value of income. For
example, Cohen and Dupas (2010) finds that willingness to pay for bednets in Kenya is a
poor predictor of actual use.38 In that setting, other trade-offs—such as willingness to wait,
willingness to perform tedious tasks, or willingness to return at a later time—may be more
informative of agents’ intended behavior. The choice of the relevant trade-off is an important
degree of freedom that can and should be guided by local knowledge.
In general, it is clear that implementing the ideas advocated in this paper entails complex
experimental designs, and the details of an individual experiment may need to be fine tuned
with careful, context-dependent, pilot projects. However, we are encouraged by recent field
experiments showing that complex designs can be successfully implemented (see Ashraf et
al., 2010; Karlan and Zinman, 2009; and particularly Berry et al., 2011, which implements a
BDM mechanism in the field). Thus, despite the significant caveats detailed in this section,
we are hopeful that our approach will prove useful in guiding future field work.
7.2 Theoretical Extensions
Our approach also suggests directions for further theoretical work. We believe these ex-
tensions are sufficiently interesting in their own right to deserve independent analyses. We
outline two of these extensions, specifying both the challenges they pose and their potential
value added.
Extension to Dynamic Mechanisms. While our framework can accommodate learn-
ing and dynamic effort expenditure by agents, we focus on mechanisms that elicit agents’
preferences only once. This is a significant restriction, as identifying whether, and how,
agents change their behavior over time is an important input in the analysis of treatment
effects (Philipson and Desimone, 1997; Philipson and Hedges, 1998; Scharfstein et al., 1999;
38Note that this is not always the case. Ashraf et al. (2010) documents the opposite finding for water
treatment products in Zambia.
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Chan and Hamilton, 2006). However, the timing of elicitation is a free design variable. In
particular, it may occur before or after an agent has been exposed to the technology.
For concreteness, consider a technology that requires sustained effort to yield returns, for
example, anti-depressants with delayed effects, technologies exhibiting significant learning-
by-doing, and so on. Eliciting how preferences change over time would improve inference
by helping to distinguish agents exhibiting consistent motivation throughout the trial from
agents whose motivation drops in the middle. The difficulty is that eliciting preferences
in the future necessarily changes an agent’s beliefs about future treatment status, and, in
turn, changes current effort expenditure. In particular, if an agent is promised treatment in
future periods to induce a particular effort level today, then it becomes impossible to elicit
preferences in the future without breaking this promise.39
Extension to Multi-agent Mechanisms. The mechanisms considered in this paper are
all single-agent mechanisms—an agent’s assignment depends only on the message he sends
and not on the messages sent by other agents. This allows us to identify an agent’s pref-
erences, and thus his beliefs about his own returns to treatment and to effort. Considering
multi-agent mechanisms, in which assignment depends on the messages sent by others, can
allow us to identify an agent’s beliefs about others agents’ values, others agents’ success
rates, and so on.
The information elicited by multi-agent mechanisms may be useful if there are external-
ities between agents, as in Miguel and Kremer (2004), or to investigate social learning. For
example, if we observe that most agents have low value for the technology, but believe that
others have high value for the technology, this suggests a specific failure of social learning,
and provides us with the means to correct it. Indeed, if most agents do not expend effort
using the technology, but believe others do, then they will interpret each others’ poor out-
39In the context of labor market experiments, Abbring and Van den Berg (2003, 2005) makes a similar
point: if expectations of potential access to treatment change ex ante behavior (for example, investment in
human capital), then treatment effects are not identified.
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comes as a signal that even with high effort the technology does not yield returns. Providing
the agents with actual data on others’ willingness to pay corrects these inference mistakes
and may increase experimentation.
Appendix
A Extensions
A.1 General Outcome Space
Most of the results extend directly to the case where y takes values in a general outcome
space Y , and is distributed according to some density function fy(R, τ, e, t). We denote by
fy,t(τ, e) ≡
∫
R
fy(R, τ, e, t)dt(R) the subjective distribution of returns from the perspective of
an agent of type t. Values go from being sums of two terms to being integrals, and incentive
contracts are now functions w : Y → R. We have that
Vt = max
e∈E
∫
y
u(y, t)fy,t(τ = 1, e)dy − c(e, t)
Vt(φ) = max
e∈E
φ
∫
y
u(y, t)fy,t(τ = 1, e)dy + (1− φ)
∫
y
u(y, t)fy,t(τ = 0, e)dy − c(e, t)
Vt(τ, w) = max
e∈E
∫
y
[u(y, t) + w(y)]fy,t(τ, e)dy − c(e, t).
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 extend directly with these generalized value functions.
Propositions 6 and 7, which identify subjective returns to treatment and effort differ as
follows. As we have that
∀y0, ∂Vt(τ, w)
∂w(y0)
= fy,t(τ, e
∗(τ, w, t))(y0),
Proposition 7 extends directly.
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Proposition 6, which deals with blind trials, is more difficult to extend, as now we have
only a one-dimensional instrument, φ ∈ [0, 1] to identify an entire function fy,t rather than
the single parameter qt. We now identify
∂Vt(φ)
∂φ
=
∫
y
u(y, t)[fy,t(τ = 1, e
∗(φ, t))(y)− fy,t(τ = 0, e∗(φ, t))(y)]dy, (3)
which corresponds to a utility weighted subjective treatment effect given subjectively appro-
priate effort under belief φ.
A.2 Eliciting Preferences under Non-Quasilinear Utility
The approach developed in this paper largely extends to the case where preferences are
not quasilinear, although we must consider slightly different mechanisms. We now consider
utility taking the form u(y, e, p, t) where y ∈ Y , e ∈ E, p ∈ P is now a prize (that is, a
bundle of goods which may or may not include monetary transfers), and t is the agent’s
type. We focus on the case where there exists an unambiguously most desirable prize p ∈ P ,
and an unambiguously least desirable prize, p ∈ P .
In the case of open trials, indirect preferences take the following form:
Vt(τ, p) = max
e
∫
y
u(y, e, p, t)fy,t(τ, e)dy.
Say we want to elicit preference over (τ, p) ∈ {0, 1} × P . We assume for simplicity that for
all such (τ, p), Vt(τ = 0, p) ≤ Vt(τ, p) ≤ Vt(τ = 1, p). We normalize Vt(τ = 0, p = p) = 0
and Vt(τ = 1, p = p) = 1. Consider the following generalization of the BDM mechanism: an
agent sends a message m ∈ R{0,1}×P , which corresponds to a value function; the principal
randomly picks (τ, p, λ) from some continuous distribution over {0, 1} × P × [0, 1]; an agent
is assigned (τ, p) if m(τ, p) > λ and the lottery λ× (τ = 1, p = p) + (1− λ)× (τ = 0, p = p)
otherwise. In this setting it is dominant for an agent to send message m = Vt. Similar
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mechanisms allow us to identify indirect preferences in the case of blind and incentivized
trials.
Propositions 1, 3, 4 and 5 extend directly with these generalized value functions. Again,
extending Propositions 6 and 7 requires some more work. Proposition 6—which identifies
subjective returns to effort using blind trials—extends as is when y ∈ {0, 1}, and extends
according to (3) when y takes values in a general outcome set Y . Proposition 7 extends
as is when preferences are separable in prize p, that is, when u(y, e, p, t) = u0(y, e, t) −
u1(p, t). When preferences are not separable in prize p, incentivized trials allow us to identify
fy,t(y)
∂u
∂w(y)
∣∣∣
y,p
for all values of y and p. Note that when preferences are separable, the
multiplicative constant can be identified from the fact that probabilities sum to 1.
B Implementation
B.1 Implementing Open Selective Trials as a Finite Menu of Lot-
teries
The mechanisms described in the paper all use a continuum of messages and elicit the agent’s
exact willingness to pay. Of course, it is possible to use simpler mechanisms to elicit coarser
information. This example shows how to identify which of N intervals an agent’s willingness
to pay belongs to.
The principal chooses value thresholds −Vmax = V0 < V1 < · · · < VN = Vmax. She can
elicit the interval where an agent’s value lies by offering a menu of lotteries. This menu is
constructed with messages M = {1, · · · , N} and any increasing sequence pi(1) < pi(2) <
· · · < pi(N) of sampling rates. Thus, message m ∈ M corresponds to buying the lottery
that delivers treatment with probability pi(m). In order to match these messages with the
appropriate value interval, the principal simply sets p(m), the price of lottery m, according
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to:
∀k > 1, p(k) = p(k − 1) + (pi(k)− pi(k − 1))Vk−1. (4)
Note that the sequence of prices is entirely determined by p(1). Denote by Gpi,p the mecha-
nism corresponding to this menu of lotteries, then:
Fact 4. Under mechanism Gpi,p an agent of type t sends message k if and only if Vt ∈
[Vk−1, Vk].
This emphasizes the many degrees of freedom the principal has when implementing selec-
tive trials as menus of lotteries. The value intervals according to which agents are classified,
and the rates according to which they obtain treatment are, to a large extent, free param-
eters. The only restriction is that sampling rates must be increasing in an agent’s value
(Proposition 2).
B.2 Implementing Incentivized Selective Trials
This section complements Section 6 by describing how to implement incentivized selective
trials as an extension of the BDM mechanism. Let the message space M be the set of
(normalized) possible utility functions Vt(τ, w):
M =
{
m ∈ R{0,1}×R s.t. m(0, 0) = 0} .
Let Fτ,w be a full support probability distribution over {0, 1}×R and let (Fp|τ,w)(τ,w)∈{0,1}×R
denote a set of full-support conditional probability distributions over p ∈ R. The mechanism
is run as follows: the agent submits a utility function mi. A pair (τi, wi) and a price pi are
drawn according to Fτ,w and Fp|τi,wi . If pi ≤ mi(τi, wi), then the agent is given allocation
(τi, wi) and pays pi. If pi > mi(τi, wi), the agent is assigned (0, 0) and makes no transfers.
Because Fτ,w as well as Fp|τ,w have full-support, it is optimal for an agent to send message
mi(t) = Vt(τ, w). In turn, a mechanism is a most informative incentivized trial if and only
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if: (i) it elicits value function Vt(τ, w), and (ii), for any message m, the induced distribution
over (τ, w) ∈ {0, 1} × R has full support.
Note that instead of eliciting preferences over a continuous domain {0, 1} ×R, the same
methodology can be used to elicit preferences over a finite grid. The distribution Fτ,w then
needs to have full-support with respect to the grid of interest.
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Online Appendix A Proofs
Fact 1 (full support sampling). Consider a mechanism G = (M,µ). If there exists ξ > 0
such that for all m ∈M , pi(m) ∈ (ξ, 1− ξ), then, with infinite samples, G0  G.
Proof: The data dG can be broken in two subsamples, (d
σ0(i)
G )i∈N and (d
σ1(i)
G )i∈N, such that
σ0, σ1 are non-decreasing mappings from N to N, and for all i ∈ N, τσ0(i) = 0 and τσ1(i) = 1.
Since ∀m, pi(m) ∈ [ξ, 1− ξ], we have that each such subsample is infinite and we can pick σ1
and σ0 to be strictly increasing from N to N. We define mapping h (such that h(dG) ∼ dG0)
as follows.
We use the notation h(dG) = (d
h
i )i∈N, where d
h
i = (m
h
i , p
h
i , τ
h
i , y
h
i ). For every i ∈ N, set
mhi = ∅, phi = 0, and draw τhi as a Bernoulli variable of parameter pi0. Finally, set yhi = yστh
i
(i).
It is easy to check that indeed, h(dG) ∼ dG0 . 
Proposition 1 (most informative mechanisms). Any strictly incentive-compatible mecha-
nism G identifies at most value Vt (that is, Vt = Vt′ ⇒ mG(t) = mG(t′)).
Whenever G identifies values Vt (that is, mG(t) = mG(t
′) ⇒ Vt = Vt′) and satisfies
full support (0 < infm pi(m) and supm pi(m) < 1), then for any strictly incentive-compatible
mechanism G′, G′  G.
Proof: The proof of the first claim is very similar to that of Fact 1. Consider a mechanism
G = (M,µG) such that every player has a strictly dominant strategy. An agent with value
V (ti) chooses a message mi to solve
max
m∈M
pi(m)V (ti)− Eµ[pi|mi = m].
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This problem is entirely defined by player i’s value V (ti). Since a.e. player has a strictly
optimal message, this problem has a unique solution for a.e. value.
We now construct a mapping h : D → ∆(D) such that the data generated by G′ can
be simulated from data generated by G using mapping h. For simplicity we describe the
mapping h in the case where M is finite. Given dG, h(dG) is generated as follows.
First, we break down the basic data dG in 2 × card M subsets, according to treatment
τ and the message mG(V ) corresponding to the value declared by the agent. Formally, for
all m ∈ M and τ ∈ {0, 1}, we define (dσm,τ (i)G )i∈N the ordered subsequence such that for
all i, mG(Vσm,τ (i)) = m and τσm,τ (i) = τ . Since 0 < infm pi(m) < supm pi(m) < 1, all these
subsamples are infinite. Hence, σm,τ can be chosen to be strictly increasing from N → N.
We use these subsamples to simulate data dG′ .
Let us denote h(dG) = (d
h
i )i∈N. For all i ∈ N, dhi = (mhi , phi , τhi , yhi ). We first set
mhi = mG′(Vi). Then using µG′(m
h
i ), we draw values τ
h
i and p
h
i . Finally we set y
h
i = yσmh
i
,τh
i
(i).
This defines h : D → ∆(D). It is easy to check that h(dG) ∼ dG′ .1 This concludes the proof.

Fact 2 (BDM Implementation). Whenever Fp has full support over [−Vmax, Vmax], an agent
with value Vt sends optimal message mBDM = Vt and the BDM mechanism is a most infor-
mative mechanism.
Proof: The fact that the BDM mechanism elicits values is well-known. Since Fp has full
support over [−Vmax, Vmax], assignment to treatment also satisfies full support and the second
part of Proposition 1 implies that GBDM is a most informative mechanism. 
1Note that for the sake of notational simplicity, this construction ends up wasting data points by not
taking consecutive elements from the subsamples. This is inconsequential here since we have infinitely many
data points.
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Proposition 2 (monotonicity). Consider a strictly incentive compatible mechanism G. If
agents t and t′ with values Vt > Vt′ send messages mG(t) 6= mG(t′), then it must be that
pi(mG(t)) > pi(mG(t
′)).
Proof: Agents of type t and t′ are such that Vt > Vt′ and mG(t) 6= mG(t′). Denote
pi(m) = Prob(τ = 1|m) and pmG = EµG(·|m)[p]. By optimality of the message, it must be
that
pi(mG(t))Vt − pmG(t) > pi(mG(t′))Vt − pmG(t′)
pi(mG(t
′))Vt′ − pmG(t′) > pi(mG(t))Vt′ − pmG(t).
Adding the two inequalities yields that [pi(mG(t))− pi(mG(t′))](Vt − Vt′) > 0, which implies
that pi(mG(t)) > pi(mG(t
′)). 
Proposition 3 (sampling rates and incentives). For any mechanism G = (M,µ) and ρ < ρ
in (0, 1), there exists a mechanism G′ = (M,µ′) such that G  G′, and for all m ∈ M ,
pi′(m) ∈ [ρ, ρ].
The following must also hold. Denoting the expected utility of type t sending message m
in mechanism G′ (including transfers) by U(t|m,G′), then
max
m1,m2∈M
|U(t|m1, G′)− U(t|m2, G′)| ≤ 2(ρ− ρ)Vmax.
Proof: We begin with the first assertion. Given mechanism G = (M,µ), we define mecha-
Online Appendix–3
nism G′ = (M,µ′) as follows:
∀m ∈M, µ′(m) =

τ = 0, p = 0 with probability ρ
µ(m) with probability ρ− ρ
τ = 1, p = 0 with probability ρ
Clearly, mechanism G′ is strategically equivalent to mechanism G. The proof that G  G′
is omitted since it is essentially identical to that of Fact 1.
We now turn to the second assertion. Consider two messages m1 (optimally) sent by
a type with value V1, and m2 (optimally) sent by a type with value V2. Let pG′(m) =
EµG′ (·|m)[p]. We must have that
piG′(m1)V1 − pG′(m1) ≥ piG′(m2)V1 − pG′(m2)
piG′(m2)V2 − pG′(m2) ≥ piG′(m1)V2 − pG′(m1)
within mechanism G′. These two inequalities yield that (piG′(m2)− piG′(m1))V1 ≤ pG′(m2)−
pG′(m1) ≤ (piG′(m2) − piG′(m1))V2, which implies that |pG′(m2) − pG′(m1)| < (ρ − ρ)Vmax.
Hence the difference in utilities between sending two messages m1 and m2 for an agent with
value V ∈ [−Vmax, Vmax] is |(piG′(m1)− piG′(m2))V − pG′(m1) + pG′(m2)| ≤ 2(ρ− ρ)Vmax. 
Proposition 4 (most informative mechanisms). Any strictly incentive-compatible blind mech-
anism G identifies at most the mapping Vt(φ) (that is, Vt(φ) = Vt′(φ)⇒ mG(t) = mG(t′)).
If G identifies Vt(φ) (that is, mG(t) = mG(t
′)⇒ Vt(φ) = Vt′(φ)) and satisfies infφ,m µ(φ|m) >
0 then G′  G for any strictly incentive-compatible mechanism G′.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 4 is essentially identical to that of Proposition 1 and hence
omitted. 
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Proposition 5 (a test of “intention to change behavior”).
If e∗(φ=0, t) = e∗(φ=1, t), then for all ϕ, Vt(φ=ϕ) = ϕVt(φ=1).
If e∗(φ=0, t) 6= e∗(φ=1, t), then for all ϕ ∈ (0, 1), Vt(φ=ϕ) < ϕVt(φ=1).
Proof: The proof is given for the general case where there might be multiple optimal effort
choices. Let Vt(τ, e) denote the expected value of type t under treatment status τ and when
expending effort e. We have that
Vt(φ) = max
e∈E
φVt(τ=1, e) + (1− φ)Vt(τ=0, e)
≤ φmax
e∈E
Vt(τ=1, e) + (1− φ) max
e∈E
Vt(τ=0, e).
If arg maxe∈E Vt(τ=1, e)∩arg maxVt(τ=0, e) 6= ∅, the inequality is an equality and, since we
normalized Vt(φ=0) = 0 we obtain that Vt(ϕ) = ϕVt(φ=1). Inversely, if arg maxe∈E Vt(τ =
1, e) ∩ arg maxVt(τ=0, e) = ∅, the inequality is strict and Vt(ϕ) < ϕVt(φ = 1). 
Proposition 6 (identifying perceived returns to effort). For any value ϕ,
∂Vt(φ)
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ
= [qt(τ=1, e
∗(ϕ, t))− qt(τ=0, e∗(ϕ, t))]× [u(y=1, t)− u(y=0, t)].
Proof: The result follows directly from applying the Envelope Theorem to (1). 
Proposition 7 (identifying perceived success rates).
∀τ, w, ∂Vt(τ, w)
∂w
= qt(τ, e
∗(τ, w, t)).
Proof: The result follows directly from applying the Envelope Theorem to (2). 
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Fact 3. Assume that outcome y = 1 yields strictly greater utility than y = 0, that is,
u(y=1, t) > u(y=0, t), and an agent perceives treatment to be beneficial:
∀e0 ∈ E,∃e1 ∈ E s.t. c(e1, t) ≤ c(e0, t) and qt(τ=0, e0) < qt(τ=1, e1).
Then, w0,t = max{w | Vt(τ=1, w) = Vt(τ=0, w)}.
Proof: Whenever w = w0,t, the agent is perfectly insured and Vt(τ = 1, w) = Vt(τ = 0, w)
since access to the technology is valuable only in so far as it affects outcomes. We now show
that whenever w > w0,t, Vt(τ=1, w) > Vt(τ=0, w). The agent’s value is
Vt(τ, w) = max
e∈E
qt(τ, e)[u(y=1, t)− u(y=0, t) + w] + u(y=0, t)− c(e, t).
Let e∗0 be the agent’s optimal effort level if τ = 0. By assumption, there exists e1 such that
c(e1, t) ≤ c(e∗0, t) and qt(τ = 1, e1) > qt(τ = 0, e∗0). Since w > w0,t = u(0, t) − u(1, t), it
follows that the agent gets strictly higher value under configuration (τ = 1, e1) than under
configuration (τ=0, e∗0). This concludes the proof. 
Fact 4. Under mechanism Gpi,p an agent of type t sends message k if and only if Vt ∈
[Vk−1, Vk].
Proof: Indeed, mGpi,p(V ) = k if and only if for all k
′ 6= k,
V pik − pk > V pik′ − pk′ . (5)
For k′ < k, this last condition is equivalent to V ≥ maxk′<k{(pk − pk′)/(pik − pik′)}, which
in turn is equivalent to V > Vk−1. Similarly, for k′ > k, (5) is equivalent to Vk > V . This
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concludes the proof. 
Online Appendix B A Numerical Example
This section illustrates the step-by-step process of inference from trial data, starting with
a standard RCT, adding data from open selective trials, and concluding by adding both
objective and subjective data from an incentivized trial.
We return to a setting where returns are two dimensional: R = (Rb, Re). As before, in
the context of a water treatment product, Rb could be the baseline returns of using the water
treatment product only when it is convenient to do so and Re the returns to using it more
thoroughly (for instance, bringing treated water when away from home). Success rates are
given by:
q(τ=0, e) = 0 and q(τ=1, e) = Rb + eRe,
where e ∈ R+ is the agent’s effort expenditure. An agent with type t has beliefs Rt =
(Rb,t, Re,t) and maximizes Et[y]−c(e) where c(e) = e22 . The effort expended in an incentivized
trial is thus e∗(w, t) = Re,t(1 + w), which nests the effort decision of an open trial, e∗(w=
0, t) = Re,t.
Throughout, we illustrate the inference process by considering the case where each pa-
rameter has a low and high value: Re, Re,t ∈ {1/4, 1/2}, Rb ∈ {0, 1/8} and Rb,t ∈ {0, 3/32}.
Each element of a selective trial adds data which will narrow down the set of possible values.2
Inference from an RCT. An RCT identifies the average treatment effect, ∆̂ = Rb+Re×
Re,t. For the numerical values specified above, the possible outcomes are described in the
2For simplicity, we consider priors that put point masses on a few possible states. Unfortunately, such
strong priors often result in degenerate inference problems. We computed the states to keep the inference
problem well-defined and better reflect the mechanics of inference from a continuous state space. This
accounts for our somewhat unusual parameter values.
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following matrix
Re = 1/2 Re = 1/4
Re,t = 1/2 Re,t = 1/4 Re,t = 1/2 Re,t = 1/4
Rb = 1/8 ∆̂ = 3/8 ∆̂ = 1/4 ∆̂ = 1/4 ∆̂ = 3/16
Rb = 0 ∆̂ = 1/4 ∆̂ = 1/8 ∆̂ = 1/8 ∆̂ = 1/16.
As illustrated by the matrix, if ∆̂ ∈ {1/16, 3/16, 3/8} this identifies the returns of the
technology (Rb, Re). However, treatment effects ∆̂ ∈ {1/8, 1/4} are consistent with multiple
true returns.3 In particular, when ∆̂ = 1/4, it may be that casual use of the water treatment
product is not particularly effective (Rb = 0), more thorough use is not particularly effective
(Re = 1/4), or more thorough use is effective, but agents don’t believe it is, and so do
not expend much effort into using the water treatment product more thoroughly (Re =
1/2, Re,t = 1/4.).
Inference from a Selective Open Trial. By Fact 1, open selective trials identify treat-
ment effects ∆̂. Additionally, by Proposition 1, an open selective trial identifies the agent’s
willingness to pay for treatment Vt = Rb,t +R
2
e,t/2. To illustrate the value of this data, focus
on the case where ∆̂ = 1/4. As shown above, this is consistent with three different vectors
of (Rb, Re, Re,t). Based on this, we illustrate the six possible values of Vt in the following
matrix:
3For example, (Rb = 0, Re = 1/2, Re,t = 1/2), (Rb = 1/8, Re = 1/2, Re,t = 1/4) and (Rb = 1/8, Re =
1/4, Re,t = 1/2) are all consistent with ∆̂ = 1/4.
Note that agents’ beliefs may be self-confirming. For instance, an agent who believes that effort has high
returns, Re,t = 1/2, who observes ∆̂ = 1/4 will continue to believe returns are high, even though this data
could be generated by Re = 1/4. Such self-confirming beliefs are frequent in the experimentation and social
learning literatures (Rothschild, 1974; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992).
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Rb = 0, Re = 1/2, Re,t = 1/2 Rb = 1/8, Re = 1/2, Re,t = 1/4 Rb = 1/8, Re = 1/4, Re,t = 1/2
Rb,t = 3/32 Vt = 7/32 Vt = 1/8 Vt = 7/32
Rb,t = 0 Vt = 1/8 Vt = 1/32 Vt = 1/8.
If Vt = 1/32 the data from selective trials indicates Re,t = 1/4 = e
∗. As the treatment effect is
∆̂ = 1/4 the only consistent returns are Rb = 1/8 and Re = 1/2. If Vt = 7/32, there remains
uncertainty, as the data is consistent with both (Rb = 0, Re = 1/2) and (Rb = 0, Re = 1/4).
Finally if Vt = 1/8, the data is consistent with any of the states (Rb, Re, Re,t) that produce
∆̂ = 1/4. That is to say that even in this limited example, data from a selective open trial
(and, hence, MTEs) may not help in identifying underlying returns. We now turn to how
incentivized trials allow us to infer whether effort, or returns to effort, are low.
Inference from an Incentivized Trial. Incentivized trials yield:
∆̂(w) = Rb +Re ×Re,t(1 + w) and Vt(τ=1, w) = Rb,t(1 + w) + [Re,t(1 + w)]
2
2
.
As an open selective trial already identifies Vt = Vt(w= 0) = Rb,t + R
2
e,t/2 and ∆̂ = ∆̂(w=
0) = Rb +Re×Re,t, by eliciting valuations and treatment effects for a small w, the principal
can also identify ∂Vt(τ,w)
∂w
∣∣∣
w=0
= Rb,t+R
2
e,t and
∂ b∆(w)
∂w
∣∣∣
w=0
= Re×Re,t. With this data the principal
can identify:
Re,t =
[
2
(
∂Vt
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=0
− Vt(w=0)
)]1/2
,
and thus, the rest of the unknown parameters: Re =
∂ b∆(w)
∂w
∣∣∣
w=0
/
Re,t, Rb,t =
∂Vt(τ,w)
∂w
∣∣∣
w=0
− R2e,t,
Rb = ∆̂ − Re × Re,t. The same information can be identified in a mathematically simpler,
but more data intensive, way by identifying w0,t and the empirical quantities associated with
that value.
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Altogether, incentivized selective trials allow us to identify both the true returns (Rb, Re)
and the agents’ beliefs (Rb,t, Re,t). Thus, in this example, data from a selective incentivized
trial allows a principal to determine how effective casual and thorough use of the water
treatment product is, without having to observe individual agents’ usage. This is possible,
as eliciting each agent’s indirect preferences over the water treatment product, and bonuses
associated with staying healthy, allows the principal to infer the agents’ beliefs about the
effects of casual and more thorough usage. This, in turn, allows the principal to infer behavior
and identify the deep structural parameters determining the product’s effectiveness, as well
as how beliefs about effectiveness lead to different outcomes.
Online Appendix–10
